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SCAN-7076

DEC 13 1954

Senior Representative, []

Chief, RE

PSDM/CMST

Project Objectives and Propaganda Guidance

REFERENCE: SCAN-5107, 15 June 1954

1. Referenced dispatch stated our intention of providing the field with an up-to-date statement of approved CMST objectives, together with the necessary interpretation and policy guidance. The attachment is intended to fulfill that commitment and, at the same time, to suggest for your concurrence a revised propaganda guidance for CMST (and by extension, CSTRK).

2. The issuance of this guidance was stimulated by the publication some months ago of Field Handbook 53-600-1 entitled, "Evaluation of Radio Broadcast Operations." The Handbook, as you are aware, is an exhaustive discussion of the techniques involved in operating and evaluating a clandestine radio station. It is acknowledged by the staff that prepared it that not all of it is applicable to every clandestine operation of this kind. In the case of CSTRK, we have the following suggestions for the implementation of the handbook:

a. We feel that sections IV-A(5) (mail response), V-A(2), and A(3) (financial and personnel procedures) can be disregarded for the time being.

b. We feel that sections IV-A(1)e and f should be carried out now, along with sections IV-A(2) through IV-A(4). Assistance in the preparation of coverage maps (IV-A(2)) should be requested from HOLLIS/Athens. No more than two such maps a year will be necessary. Headquarters is implementing section IV-B(1) by means of the attachment although a periodic field review of the adequacy of the guidance is advisable. Section V-A(1), covering the evaluation of technical efficiency, much of which is already practiced, should also be carried out.

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c. The remainder of the Handbook's directives, comprising sections IV-A(1)a through d and IV-B(2) should be kept in mind for implementation if and when time and personnel permit. As regards section IV-C (measuring program impact) certain phases are already carried out as a matter of course and others will immediately be recognized by the field as impracticable owing to local circumstances. The remainder of this portion should be implemented if means are available to do so.

Attachment:

1 (as stated above)

SE/UPP-bk

3 December 1954

Distribution:

3 - ☐ ☐ (w/1 attach.)
2 - SE/UPP (w/1 attach.)
2 - SE/1 (w/1 attach.)
1 - SE/EI (w/o attach.)
1 - PP/ICD/Radio (w/1 attach.)
1 - RI (w/1 attach.)

☐ C/SE

SE/1

PP/ICD/Radio

☐ SE/ACPP

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ATTN: ment to SQAN-7676

GUIDANCE FOR CREST

1. The objective of Project CREST, briefly stated in the CREST Project Outline (approved on 18 July 1954 and forwarded to the field in ☐ 1970, MAPOR 444 is "to further the HUCOWH mission of HUBARK against Albania by means of clandestine radio broadcasts of a propaganda nature." This mission is implicitly covered in the overall denied area HUCOWH policy guidance recently forwarded to the ☐ ☐ Without specifically mentioning Albania, this guidance advises the field of both long-range and current national policy objectives with respect to the European satellites. As they apply to our HUCOWH effort against Albania, the long-range objectives may be generalized as a two-fold effort aimed toward:

a. The disruption of the Moscow-Tirana relationship, minimizing Albania's contribution to the Soviet position by undermining the regime and diverting Soviet attention from aggressive plans to difficulties within Albania;

b. The promotion of conditions favorable to the eventual liberation of Albania.

2. The following general propaganda themes are suggested for exploitation by CREST in implementing the above objectives:

a. For implementation of objective (a) above:

1) Exploit conflicts between the Albanian Communist regime and Moscow;

2) Exploit conflicts within the Albanian Communist regime (such as between Shoku and Hoxha, between the regular military forces and the Sigurimi);

3) Foster disaffection in the Albanian Armed Forces, Police and Sigurimi;

4) Encourage defection of key Albanian personnel.

b. For implementation of objective (b) above:

1) Maintain the hope of eventual liberation through evidence of the continued interest of the West and continued strength of the HUBEIGH. Commitments on the nature and timing of CREST assistance are to be avoided;

2) Encourage the increased use of passive resistance without inciting to premature revolt or to any anti-regime action which would yield a net loss through probable reprisals;

3) Foster Albanian nationalism without commitments that might interfere with CREST post-liberation objectives.

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3. Propaganda guidance on special Albanian problems:

a. **MISSION:** Our propaganda media should make every effort to maintain and contribute to the prestige and integrity of the MISSION as the repository of Albanian hope for freedom, democracy and independence. No reference should be made to the so-called "MDCY."

b. **International Integrity:** Propaganda should picture MISSION, in concert with the Western powers, as the protector of Albania's territorial integrity. At the same time, no commitments should be made to support Albania's claim to territory now part of Greece or Yugoslavia (e.g. limits-ions on these (b2) above).

c. **Relations with Western neighbors (especially Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy):** Our propaganda should call for friendly relations between Albania and her Balkan neighbors, citing particularly the Balkan Friendship Treaty and Military Alliance as an example of the resolution of ancient Balkan animosities as well as of the opportunity for independent existence outside the Soviet bloc.

d. **Post-liberation Government:** Our propaganda should emphasize the right of the Albanian people to an independent government of their free choice. All discussion of the nature and composition of a post-liberation Albanian government should follow the formula "the people themselves will decide in free elections." At the same time, the reservations expressed in paragraph 3(b) above must be observed.

e. **The Komintern:** Our propaganda should continue to avoid the subject of one King or two, making clear when necessary that his role in Albania will be freely determined by the people themselves.

f. **Yugoslavia:** Although national policy directs us to be prepared to exploit any fissile tendencies that may develop in Albania, this should not be interpreted as requiring us to support any fissile doctrine or any Yugoslav foreign policy objectives respecting Albania which might have the effect of restoring Albania to its former position as a Yugoslav satellite. On the basis of recent developments, it appears that earlier guidance with respect to exploiting Yugoslav divisions with the communists and giving minimum attention to the League of Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia may have become somewhat obsolete. Nevertheless, this guidance still represents national policy and should be adhered to in the event that recurring episodes of strain and tension between Yugoslavia and the satellites provide a suitable occasion. Furthermore, in the highly unlikely event of a Yugoslav attack aimed at the overthrow of the current Titist regime, the guidance forwarded as SOAN 274, remains in effect.

g. **Land Reform:** The remarks under 3(d) above apply to this topic as well.

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4. Scope and Pace (of CBTEST): National policy with respect to the European satellites is interpreted in ☐ 7251 as specifically authorizing externally executed propaganda activities, including positive or disruptive appeals through such HQUARK-controlled assets as CBTEST. The guidance further recognizes the secondary priority (in terms of effort) assigned radio projects, following leaflet production and distribution. Present pace of CBTEST operations (approximately eight new broadcasts per month, each broadcast transmitted roughly eight hours per day, using two frequencies simultaneously for four hours) is also approved therein.

5. With regard to methods to be used to carry out the foregoing guide lines, no change is proposed in the current CBTEST approach, i.e., the present aggressive tone should be maintained, no mention should be made of the site of the broadcasts and the station should continue to speak in the name of HQUARK.

6. Your comments and suggested alterations for the brief propaganda guidance section above would be welcomed. In conclusion it should be noted that in Headquarters' opinion the changes in this guidance are not of sufficient political significance to warrant discussion with the Smothers. In discussion with valuable officers, no reference should be made to the fact that a new guidance is in effect.

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